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1
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie
Trachman Professor of Law of the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.1 He
teaches and writes about state and local taxation. As a
teacher and a scholar, he has an interest in the sound
development of the tax law, including the constitutional rules governing taxation. In addition, Professor
Zelinsky is a Connecticut resident who works from
home on a majority of his work days, doing legal research and writing. Professor Zelinsky challenged New
York’s taxation of his Cardozo salary paid to him for
his remote work days in Connecticut. See Zelinsky v.
Tax Appeals Tribunal, 1 N.Y. 3d 85 (2003), cert. denied
541 U.S. 1009 (2004).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

1

The views expressed in this brief are Professor Zelinsky’s
personal views as amicus curiae. Neither Cardozo Law School nor
Yeshiva University expresses any opinion on the issues addressed
in this brief. The amicus curiae afﬁrms that no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person contributed any money to fund this brief ’s preparation or submission.
Professor Zelinsky used funds from his legal research account to
defray printing costs. New Hampshire and Massachusetts have
both consented to the ﬁling of this amicus curiae brief. Timely notice was provided to both parties.

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case concerns a bedrock question at the heart
of our federal system: Can a state leap over its border
to tax a nonresident remote worker who never sets foot
in the taxing state? The emphatic answer is “no.”
Massachusetts’ recent attempts to tax New Hampshire residents working remotely at their homes for
Massachusetts employers is part of an older and
broader problem: Well before Covid-19, other states,
starting with New York but now including Pennsylvania, Nebraska and Delaware, have taxed nonresidents
on the incomes they earn remotely beyond the borders
of the taxing state.
This extraterritorial taxation violates both the
Due Process and Commerce Clauses: According to this
Court’s longstanding precedent, a state may tax nonresidents only on income that is properly apportioned
to the taxpayer’s activity within the taxing state’s borders. When, for example, a customer service representative works over the internet from her home in
Montana for a California call center, only Montana can
constitutionally tax her salary. California cannot double tax that income earned in Montana.
The constitutional requirement that a state tax
only nonresidents’ properly apportioned incomes
earned within the taxing state’s borders comports with
basic federalism values as well as common sense: Otherwise, a cash-strapped legislature will always seek a
free lunch served by a sister state’s residents. These

3
constitutional principles also ensure basic fairness by
curbing double state taxation of the same income.
As a result of Covid-19, millions of Americans have
begun to work remotely from their homes. Consequently, the pre-existing problem of double and overtaxation by some states has become more pressing.
Massachusetts is now the most recent state to tax nonresidents working remotely at their out-of-state homes
for Massachusetts employers. Massachusetts’ motivations are as obvious as they are unconstitutional.
Facing a Covid-19-caused revenue shortfall, Massachusetts taxes a population that does not vote in Massachusetts, indeed, a population that today no longer
sets foot in Massachusetts, namely, the residents of
New Hampshire and other states who now work remotely at their out-of-state homes.
This is no isolated, cross-border skirmish. For
three reasons, this Court’s intervention is desirable
and necessary to solve the troubling national problem
of unconstitutional double and over-taxation of interstate remote workers.
First, ordinary taxpayers have no practical remedy to the problem of unconstitutional state taxation
of their remote working salaries. The Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, requires nonresidents to seek relief from the administrative tribunals and courts of the
taxing states. These state tribunals and courts often do
not protect nonresidents, but instead burden them
with the prohibitive cost of state court litigation in tax

4
fora frequently hostile to fundamental constitutional
norms.
Second, for over a decade and one-half, Congress
has proved incapable of solving the problem of unconstitutional state income taxation of nonresidents’ incomes. This Court is the only practical forum available
for combating the unconstitutional state income taxation of interstate remote workers.
Third, only this Court can delineate the boundaries of state authority in the context of a modern, integrated and digital national economy. In cases such as
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018)
and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137
S.Ct. 1773 (2017), this Court has set the rules for the
exercise of state authority over nonresidents in our
modern economy. This case is of a similar import. This
Court should take this case, not simply to enforce constitutionally apportioned and fair state income taxation of nonresident remote workers, but to further
delineate the boundaries of state authority over nonresidents in a modern economy. This is a tax case, but
it is about more than just taxation.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

A state cannot tax nonresidents’ incomes
earned beyond the state’s borders.

It is a bedrock principle of federalism that a state
cannot tax a nonresident on income the nonresident

5
earns outside that state. If a state could grab income
generated by nonresidents outside the state’s borders,
every state would seek a free lunch served by a sister
state’s residents.
Under the Due Process Clause, a state taxing nonresidents “generally may tax only income earned
within the” state, not income nonresidents earn outside the taxing state’s boundaries. Okla. Tax Comm’n
v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463 n. 11 (1995);
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) (“As to nonresidents, the jurisdiction extends only to their property owned within the State and their business, trade,
or profession carried on therein, and the tax is only on
such income as is derived from those sources.”); Travis
v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75 (1920) (state
“has jurisdiction to impose a tax of this kind upon the
incomes of non-residents arising from any business,
trade, profession, or occupation carried on within its
borders . . . ”).
Moreover, when income is earned by activity that
straddles state borders, the Commerce Clause independently requires that a state must stop at its border
and tax only the portion of such interstate income
properly apportioned to that state. MeadWestvaco
Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008)
(“The Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy . . .
unfairly apportioned taxation.”); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (state
tax must be “fairly apportioned” to the taxing state);
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175,
207 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“reafﬁrm[ing] the

6
Central Greyhound principle” of apportionment); Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663
(1948) (New York “gross receipts” tax must be “fairly
apportioned” to business done in New York).
Consider, for example, an Iowa resident who works
for her Nebraska employer one day a week in Omaha
and works the other four days at the Iowa resident’s
home in Council Bluffs. This Court’s Due Process and
Commerce Clause case law requires Nebraska to tax
only the one-ﬁfth of this Iowa resident’s income earned
in Nebraska.2 Failure to observe this constitutional
norm results in double taxation by Nebraska and Iowa,
the state of this worker’s residence.
II.

Massachusetts’ recent attempt to tax New
Hampshire residents working at home reflects an older and broader problem.
A) Unfortunately, some states ﬂout the
longstanding constitutional prohibition
by taxing nonresidents’ incomes earned
outside the taxing states’ borders.

New York is the oldest and most glaring example
of a state that leaps beyond its borders to tax income
earned by nonresidents at their out-of-state homes.

2

As we shall see infra, Nebraska unconstitutionally emulates New York (and now Massachusetts) by reaching into Iowa
to tax all of the income earned by this Iowa resident at her home.
This subjects the Iowa resident to double taxation by her home
state of Iowa and by Nebraska.

7
Nominally, New York purports to tax nonresident
employees (as other states do3) based only on the portion of the nonresident’s work days in New York. 20
NYCRR § 132.18(a). In practice, however, New York
does nothing of the sort. Instead, New York considers
an employee’s work day as an out-of-state day for tax
purposes only if the nonresident works remotely “of necessity, as distinguished from convenience.” Id.4
Thus, New York’s apportionment regulation effectively provides for no apportionment at all. If, for example, a computer programmer works one day a week
in Manhattan but chooses on the other days to work
remotely from her home in Connecticut, Tennessee,
Florida or Arizona, New York asserts tax on 100% of
her income because she works at her out-of-state home
for her “convenience,” not for the employer’s “necessity.”
The amicus curiae’s case is the leading example of
this troubling taxation and of the difﬁculty remote
workers have obtaining constitutional relief from the
state courts. Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 1 N.Y.
3d 85 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004). After
New York’s highest court rejected his challenge to New
York’s overreaching taxation in 2003, New York has
3

See, e.g., La. Admin. Code tit. 61 § I-1304D.
Somewhat confusingly, this regulation is colloquially called
the “convenience of the employer” rule though that term does not
actually appear in the regulation. Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 1 N.Y. 3d 85, 89 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004)
(characterizing New York regulation as “convenience of the employer” test).
4

8
sent income tax bills to nonresidents as far away as
Tennessee,5 Florida6 and Arizona.7
Professor Zelinsky teaches at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. The
Cardozo Law School is located in New York. Professor
Zelinsky lives in Connecticut. He divides his working
time between teaching days in Manhattan and days
writing and researching at home in Connecticut. Zelinsky, 1 N.Y. 3d at 88-89.
In 1994 and 1995, Professor Zelinsky ﬁled his New
York nonresident income tax returns by apportioning
to New York the 40% of his Cardozo salary attributable
to his days teaching in New York. Id.
New York’s Department of Taxation and Finance
instead taxed all of Professor Zelinsky’s Cardozo salary
including the portion of his salary apportionable to his
days worked remotely at his home in Connecticut. Professor Zelinsky, the Department asserted, did his legal
writing and research at home in Connecticut for his
personal convenience, rather than for Cardozo’s necessity. New York’s tax collector thereby leapt over New

5

Huckaby v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 4 N.Y. 3d 427
(2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 976 (2005).
6
In the Matter of the Petition of R. Michael Holt, N.Y. Tax
Appeals Tribunal, DTA No. 821018, 2008 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 133,
2008 WL 2880343 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib.).
7
In the Matter of the Petition of Manohar and Asha Kakar,
State of New York, Division of Tax Appeals, Small Claims Determination, DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y. Div. Tax App.).

9
York’s border and taxed the salary Professor Zelinsky
actually earned at home in Connecticut.
Disregarding the strictures of the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses as explicated in this Court’s decisions, New York’s highest court sustained New York’s
extraterritorial and unconstitutional tax on the
Cardozo salary Professor Zelinsky earned working at
home in Connecticut without setting foot in New York.
Commentators have roundly criticized the New
York Court of Appeals’ decision in Zelinsky sustaining
New York’s income taxation of nonresidents who work
remotely at their out-of-state homes.8 The upshot is often double taxation of remote work income, by New
York as well as the state of the employee’s residence.
When, a year later, New York’s Court of Appeals
again confronted this question, three of the Court’s
seven judges declared New York’s regulation unconstitutional – even though two of these judges had decided
8

See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and
John A. Swain, STATE TAXATION, para. 20.05[4][e][i] (3rd ed. 2020
rev.) (Zelinsky decision “does not withstand analysis”); Morgan L.
Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in our National Economy, 8 FLA. TAX. REV. 885, 922 (2008) (“the Zelinsky court erred”);
William V. Vetter, New York’s Convenience of the Employer Rule
Conveniently Collects Cash From Nonresidents, Part 2, 42 STATE
TAX NOTES 229 (2006) (“The Court of Appeals’ statements in
Zelinsky are inconsistent with its own decision in City of New
York v. State of New York . . . ”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Coronavirus,
Telecommuting and the “Employer Convenience” Rule, 95 TAX
NOTES STATE 1101 (2020); Edward A. Zelinsky, New York’s “Convenience of the Employer” Rule is Unconstitutional, 48 STATE TAX
NOTES 553 (2008).
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the other way in Zelinsky. Nevertheless, a majority of
four judges still sustained New York’s taxation of income earned remotely in another state, in that case,
Tennessee. Huckaby v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 4
N.Y. 3d 427 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 976 (2005).
In the wake of Zelinsky and Huckaby, New York
has taxed income earned as far away from the Empire
State as Arizona and Florida. In the Matter of the Petition of Manohar and Asha Kakar, State of New York,
Division of Tax Appeals, Small Claims Determination,
DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y. Div. Tax App.)
(New York taxes nonresident’s income earned in Arizona); In the Matter of the Petition of R. Michael Holt,
N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, DTA No. 821018, 2008 N.Y.
Tax LEXIS 133, 2008 WL 2880343 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib.)
(New York taxes nonresident’s income earned in Florida).
New York’s disregard of the constitutional limitations on state taxation of nonresidents started the proverbial race-to-the-bottom as other states emulated
New York. Pennsylvania,9 for example, adopted a
9

61 Pa. Code § 109.8 (“However, any allowance claimed for
days worked outside of this Commonwealth shall be based upon
the performance of services which, of necessity, obligate the employee or casual employee to perform out-of-State duties in the
service of his employer or casual employer.”). Like New York,
Pennsylvania is doubling down on its taxation of nonresidents
who work remotely at their out-of-state homes because of the pandemic. Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, Telework During
the COVID-19 Pandemic, available at https://www.revenue.pa.
gov/COVID19/Pages/Telework.aspx (“For non-residents” now
working remotely at their homes outside Pennsylvania, “their

11
regulation mirroring New York’s. Pennsylvania’s
Board of Finance and Revenue used that regulation to
uphold the Keystone State’s taxation of a nonresident
on income he actually earned in Florida. In re: Gary T.
Bergstein Petition for Review for Personal Income Tax
Period(s) 2006-2009, 2015 PA BDFR LEXIS 2062
(Pennsylvania taxes nonresident’s income earned in
Florida). Nebraska10 and Delaware11 adopted similar
regulations, taxing nonresidents’ salary income to
those states even on days when the nonresidents work
remotely outside these states’ borders. Pursuant to
Delaware’s regulation, Delaware’s Tax Appeal Board
sustained Delaware’s tax bill sent to a Pennsylvania
resident for the income she earned on days she worked
at her home in Pennsylvania. Dorothy A. Flynn, Petitioner v. Director of Revenue, Respondent, Tax Appeal
Board for the State of Delaware, Dkt. No. 1504 (Sept.
14, 2011), available at https://ﬁnanceﬁles.delaware.

compensation would remain Pennsylvania sourced income for all
tax purposes.”).
10
316 Neb. Admin. Code § 22-003.01C(1) (“If the nonresident’s service is performed without Nebraska for his or her convenience, but the service is directly related to a business, trade,
or profession carried on within Nebraska and except for the nonresident’s convenience, the service could have been performed
within Nebraska, the compensation for such services shall be
Nebraska source income.”).
11
Del. Code Regs. 31-200-800, Director’s Ruling 71-13.3(b)
(“Any allowance claimed for days worked outside Delaware must
be based upon the performance of services which of necessity, as
distinguished from convenience, obligates the employee to out-ofstate duties in the service of his employer.”).

12
gov/TAB/1504%20Flynn.pdf (Delaware taxes nonresident’s income earned in Pennsylvania).
Massachusetts’ motivations for joining this parade
are as obvious as they are unconstitutional. Facing a
Covid-caused revenue shortfall, Massachusetts taxes a
population that does not vote in Massachusetts, indeed, a population that today no longer sets foot in
Massachusetts, namely, the residents of New Hampshire and other states who now work remotely at their
out-of-state homes. Massachusetts and the other
states taxing nonresidents on their remote work income penalize interstate remote work with double
state income taxation and over-taxation.
In short, New Hampshire’s challenge to Massachusetts’ taxation of remote workers is no isolated,
cross-border skirmish. Massachusetts’ current tax
overreach is part of an older and broader problem: Well
before the Covid-19 crisis, other states have for decades unconstitutionally taxed the incomes nonresidents earn on the days these nonresidents work at
their out-of-state homes and never set foot in the taxing state.
B) Massachusetts and the other states taxing beyond their borders cause the
double and over-taxation of interstate
remote work income.
The remote worker’s home state has the strongest
constitutional claim to tax the income the remote
worker generates working at home. As a matter of Due

13
Process, the home state has jurisdiction to tax its residents on their worldwide incomes.12 Since this resident
works in her home state, that state is also the “source”
jurisdiction in which the remote worker conducts her
occupation and earns her income.13
The Commerce Clause requires that a state’s income tax be “fairly related to beneﬁts provided the taxpayer.”14 The remote worker’s home state provides the
remote worker all of her public services while she lives
and works at home.
Thus, the remote worker’s home state does not
cause double taxation of the worker’s income. This double tax is the fault of Massachusetts and the other
states that tax individuals who work remotely at their
homes outside the taxing state’s borders.
Consider, for example, a resident of Wilmington,
Vermont who, before the Covid-19 crisis, commuted
daily to work for his employer in North Adams, Massachusetts. On these commuting days, Massachusetts
had the constitutional authority to tax this employee’s
salary from his conduct of his occupation in Massachusetts. But today, this Vermont resident no longer sets
12

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,
462-463 (1995) (A state “may tax all the income of its residents
. . . ”) (emphasis in original).
13
Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and John A.
Swain, STATE TAXATION, ¶6.04 (3rd ed. 2020 rev.) (“There are two
fundamental, but alternative, bases for state power to tax income:
residence and source.”).
14
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).

14
foot in Massachusetts. Vermont is not just this individual’s state of residence. Vermont is also the source
state of this individual’s income earned at home in Vermont.15 Vermont today provides all public services the
remote worker receives while working at home.
Massachusetts causes unconstitutional double
taxation when it leaps over the border to tax the income a Vermont resident earns remotely at home under the umbrella of Vermont’s public services.
In other cases, Massachusetts causes overtaxation. New Hampshire (unlike Vermont) does not tax
salaried income. Thus, when Massachusetts taxes New
Hampshire residents working at home, Massachusetts
does not, strictly speaking, cause double taxation. But
Massachusetts causes overtaxation by extending Massachusetts’ tax into New Hampshire, thereby taxing
income that lies exclusively within New Hampshire’s
jurisdiction on both a source and residence basis. It is
New Hampshire’s prerogative as a sovereign state to
tax or not tax this income earned in New Hampshire
by a New Hampshire resident and to ﬁnance its public
services however New Hampshire chooses.
But Massachusetts overtaxes when it reaches
across the border into New Hampshire to tax the

15

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787
(2015) involved the opposite situation. In Wynne, the taxpayers
were Maryland residents who earned money outside of Maryland.
In this example, the taxpayer is a Vermont resident who earns
money only in Vermont.

15
income a resident of the Granite State earns at her
home under the aegis of New Hampshire’s public services.
III. Remote work is growing during the Covid19 crisis and will continue to grow after
the crisis is over.
The problem of unconstitutional state income taxation of nonresidents’ remote work incomes predated
the Covid-19 crisis.16 This problem has been exacerbated by the surge of remote work during the Covid-19
crisis. The problem of extraterritorial state income taxation will grow further as remote work continues to expand after the coronavirus crisis ends.
New York has been particularly aggressive about
requiring work-at-home during the Covid-19 crisis.
New York’s governor has been a strong advocate for remote work, often also called “telecommuting.”17 At the
same time that New York requires remote work at
home to confront the Covid-19 crisis, New York openly
doubles down on its unconstitutional taxation of the

16

Zelinsky involved the tax years 1994 and 1995 and was
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 2003.
17
See, e.g., Governor Andrew Cuomo, Executive Order No.
202.6 (March 18, 2020), available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/
sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO202.6.pdf (“All businesses and not-for-proﬁt entities in the state shall utilize, to the
maximum extent possible, any telecommuting or work from home
procedures that they can safely utilize.”).
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income interstate remote workers earn at their homes
outside New York’s borders.18
Thus, at the same time that New York mandates
work-at-home to ﬁght Covid-19, New York penalizes
work-at-home by taxing the out-of-state incomes of remote workers who work at homes outside of New York.
Massachusetts’s behavior is similar, pressing for remote work19 and then taxing it.20
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New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Frequently Asked Questions about Filing Requirements, Residency,
and Telecommuting for New York State Personal Income Tax (Oct.
24, 2020), available at https://www.tax.ny.gov/pit/ﬁle/nonresident-faqs.htm#ﬁle (“If you are a nonresident whose primary ofﬁce
is in New York State, your days telecommuting during the pandemic are considered days worked in the state unless your employer has established a bona ﬁde employer ofﬁce at your
telecommuting location . . . you will continue to owe New York
State income tax on income earned while telecommuting.”).
19
Steph Solis, These Massachusetts businesses will continue
remote work during coronavirus pandemic, Gov. Charlie Baker
says, MASSLIVE.COM (May 15, 2020) available at https://www.
masslive.com/coronavirus/2020/05/these-massachusetts-businesseswill-continue-remote-work-during-coronavirus-pandemic-govcharlie-baker-says.html (“ ‘Now as we look to the weeks and
months ahead, we’re urging businesses to continue to promote remote work and work from home as much as possible,’ Baker told
reporters during his daily brieﬁng at the Massachusetts State
House.”).
20
830 C.M.R. 62.5A3(3)(a) (“[A]ll compensation received for
services performed by a non-resident who, immediately prior to
the Massachusetts COVID-19 state of emergency was an employee engaged in performing such services in Massachusetts,
and who is performing services from a location outside Massachusetts due to a Pandemic-Related Circumstance will continue to be
treated as Massachusetts source income subject to personal
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After the coronavirus crisis passes, remote work
will continue to grow.21 Consequently, even after the
coronavirus crisis ends, the problem of states unconstitutionally taxing remote workers beyond these states’
respective borders will grow further as interstate remote work continues to expand.
IV. This Court is the only practical forum available for combating the unconstitutional
state income taxation of interstate remote
work.
This is no isolated, cross-border skirmish. For
three reasons, this Court’s intervention is desirable
and necessary to solve the troubling national problem
of states unconstitutionally double- and over-taxing interstate remote workers.
income tax under M.G.L. c. 62, § 5A and personal income tax
withholding pursuant to M.G.L. c. 62B, § 2.”).
21
Prithwiraj (Raj) Choudhury, Our Work-from-Anywhere
Future, HARVARD BUS. REV. 58, 60 (Nov.-Dec. 2020) (Major corporations “have announced that they will make remote work permanent even after a vaccine is available.”); Christopher Mims,
Remote Work Won’t Be Just for White-Collar Workers, WALL. ST.
J. at R4 (Oct. 23, 2020) (“[A] host of jobs, including storekeeper
and ﬁeld engineer, that seemed out of reach of remote-work are
likely to be ﬁrmly in the remote work orbit within the next 10
years.”); Cecilia Amador de San José, Future of Work: Tech Companies are Rethinking Workplace Density (Oct. 23, 2020) https://
allwork.space/2020/10/future-of-work-tech-companies-are-rethinkingworkplace-density/ (“94% of organizations stated that they expect
remote work to be normalized in their organizations in a postvaccine environment. 76% believe that full-time remote work will
be normalized in their organizations.”).
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First, unless this Court’s hears New Hampshire’s
parens patriae case, taxpayers will have no practical
remedy for this problem. By the same token, if this
Court declines to hear New Hampshire’s lawsuit, this
Court will likely have no other vehicle for resolving
this problem.
If this Court declines to hear New Hampshire’s
parens patriae lawsuit, the Court is unlikely to see a
similar case from an individual taxpayer on certiorari
review. Key reasons why are the Tax Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1341, and the prohibitive cost for most individual taxpayers of reaching this Court. The Tax Injunction Act requires someone challenging a state tax to
eschew the federal courts and instead seek relief
through the taxing state’s administrative tribunals
and courts. These state procedures often burden litigants with prohibitive costs. A taxpayer usually must
initiate his case in a state tax tribunal. These tribunals
are typically unsympathetic to nonresidents’ constitutional rights.
See, e.g., In re: Gary T. Bergstein Petition for Review
for Personal Income Tax Period(s) 2006-2009, 2015 PA
BDFR LEXIS 2062 (Pennsylvania Board of Finance
and Revenue sustains Pennsylvania tax on income
earned by nonresident in Florida); In the Matter of the
Petition of Manohar and Asha Kakar, State of New
York, Division of Tax Appeals, Small Claims Determination, DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y. Div.
Tax App.) (New York Division of Tax Appeals sustains
New York tax on income earned by nonresident in Arizona); In the Matter of the Petition of R. Michael Holt,
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N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, DTA No. 821018, 2008 N.Y.
Tax LEXIS 133, 2008 WL 2880343 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib.)
(New York Tax Appeals Tribunal sustains New York
tax on income earned by nonresident in Florida); Dorothy A. Flynn, Petitioner v. Director of Revenue, Respondent, Tax Appeal Board for the State of Delaware,
Dkt. No. 1504 (Sept. 14, 2011), available at https://
ﬁnance.delaware.gov/state-tax-appeal-board/opinionsof-the-tax-appeal-board/ (Delaware Tax Appeal Board
sustains Delaware tax on income earned by nonresident in Pennsylvania).
Then, after exhausting these often futile administrative remedies, taxpayers challenging state taxes
must go into the state courts. This results in even more
costs in fora often unfriendly to nonresidents.
The taxpayers oppressed by states’ unconstitutional taxation of remote work are not big out-of-state
corporations with money to litigate their large claims.
The affected individuals are rank-and-ﬁle taxpayers,
nonresident individuals who work for a living at their
out-of-state homes.
As this Court noted in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88
(2004), Congress’s main goal in adopting the Tax Injunction Act was to channel into state tribunals the tax
claims of “out-of-state corporations” and similar taxpayers disputing “large sums.” Id. at 104. But for the
rank-and-ﬁle taxpayers oppressed by states’ unconstitutional taxation of interstate remote work, the sums
involved, while important for these individuals, are too
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small to justify the costs of state tax litigation, let alone
a certiorari appeal to this Court.
Under these circumstances, New Hampshire’s
parens patriae lawsuit invoking this Court’s original
jurisdiction is the only practical way these nonresidents’ constitutional concerns can be vindicated in a
neutral forum. An instructive analogy is a class action
lawsuit under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such class actions are necessary to “aggregat[e] the relatively paltry potential recoveries” of
many individuals into an economically viable lawsuit.
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 671 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
So too, in this setting, New Hampshire’s invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is the only
practical way to vindicate in a neutral forum a constitutional principle which affects thousands of rankand-ﬁle taxpayers, namely, no taxation of nonresidents
who earn income outside the taxing state’s borders.
Second, this Court should take this case for another compelling reason: Congress has proved incapable of solving the problem of unconstitutional state
income taxation of nonresidents’ remote work incomes.
For a decade and a half since New York’s courts denied
the amicus curiae relief from double state income taxation, bills have repeatedly been introduced in Congress to stop states from unconstitutionally taxing
nonresidents’ incomes earned beyond their borders.
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These bills have gone nowhere.22 In fact, these bills
have not even received a single committee hearing.
The bottlenecks of the legislative process are well
known.23 It is not surprising that, in a legislative contest pitting large states like New York and Pennsylvania against small, poorly-organized taxpayers of often
modest means, the former should prevail over the latter.
But it is one thing for congressional processes to
stymie legislation addressing issues within Congress’s
bailiwick. Constitutional rights are another matter.
This Court should not wait any longer for Congress to
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See, e.g., Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2785,
108th Cong., 2nd session; Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of
2004, H.R. 5067, 108th Cong., 2nd session. In 2004, it was more
common to use the term “telecommuting” to describe what is often
today called “remote work.” The two terms are synonymous. Over
the years, this legislation has repeatedly been reintroduced. See,
e.g., Multi-State Workers Tax Fairness Act of 2014, S. 2347, 113th
Cong., 2nd session; Multi-State Workers Tax Fairness Act of
2014, H.R. 4085, 113th Cong., 2nd session. Most recently, this legislation has been introduced as the Multi-State Worker Tax Fairness Act of 2020, H.R. 7968, 116th Cong., 2nd session. In the
interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that the amicus curiae played a role in drafting this legislation.
23
See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva and Eric Lane, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 126, 556, 558 (3rd ed. 2009); Robert A. Katzmann, JUDGING
STATUTES 15 (2014); Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2001); Walter J. Oleszek, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 18, 184 (9th ed.
2014).
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vindicate the constitutional rights of over-taxed remote workers.
Third, this Court should take this case as part of
the Court’s ongoing project to delineate the constitutional boundaries of state authority over nonresidents
in the context of a modern, integrated and digital national economy. This is a tax case, but it is about more
than taxation. It is also about the constitutional contours of state authority over nonresidents in the modern economy.
In cases such as South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138
S.Ct. 2080 (2018) and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017), this Court set the
rules for the exercise of state authority over nonresidents in our modern economy. In Wayfair, this Court
concluded that South Dakota could impose sales tax
collection responsibilities on an out-of-state vendor
without physical presence in that state since the vendor’s large “quantity of business could not have occurred unless [it] availed itself of the substantial
privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.” Id.
at 2099. In that case, the taxpayers were “large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence” in the taxing state. Id.
In a similar fashion, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
this Court held that nonresidents of California could
not sue in the California courts about a drug (Plavix)
these nonresidents claimed to be defective. These nonresidents, the Court observed, had not been “prescribed
Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in
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California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and
were not injured by Plavix in California.” Id. at 1781.
Hence, the California courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate these nonresidents’ claims.
This case is of a similar import to Wayfair and
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. This Court should hear New
Hampshire’s lawsuit, not simply to enforce constitutionally apportioned and fair state income taxation of
nonresident remote workers, but to further delineate
the constitutional boundaries of state authority over
nonresidents in a modern economy. This is a tax case,
but it is about more than just taxation.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
This Court should grant New Hampshire’s Motion
for Leave and thereby permit New Hampshire to present its case on the merits.
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